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This paper assesses whether the allocation puzzle - the tendency for capital to 
ow to
countries with relatively low productivity growth - is observed for foreign direct investment
(FDI) 
ows, which should be particularly sensitive to productivity prospects. We look both
at aggregate FDI 
ows and, using a new data set, at FDI 
ows into the main economic
sectors. We make three points. First, we do not nd evidence of an allocation puzzle
for aggregate FDI 
ows. Second, we rene the aggregate result and document substantial
sectoral heterogeneity. An allocation puzzle is observed in the agriculture, construction,
mining/petroleum/utilities, and tourism sector. By contrast, we show that countries with
faster productivity growth in manufacturing attract more FDI in that sector. The link
is even stronger for service sectors. Third, we document a role for nancial openness: a
country with fast productivity growth draws in more FDI into its service sectors only when
it is nancially open. We conclude with a discussion of some tentative explanations for the
results.
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11 Introduction
Do countries with stronger productivity growth attract more capital in
ows? According to
the neoclassical growth model (Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans) the answer is yes: strong productiv-
ity growth increases the marginal product of capital, which makes investing domestically more
protable; it also increases future incomes, which raises current consumption through the con-
sumption smoothing eect. It follows that capital in
ows and productivity growth should be
positively related. Gourinchas and Jeanne (2009) challenge this prediction by showing that de-
veloping countries and emerging markets with faster productivity growth attract less capital
in
ows. They call this observation the allocation puzzle.
In scrutinizing the allocation puzzle, we make three contributions. First, we rene the result
for total capital in
ows (measured, using data on current account decits) by disaggregating
them into their dierent components. We show in a cross-section of countries that the correla-
tion between net capital in
ows and productivity growth is positive only for net FDI in
ows; the
correlation is negative for net in
ows of portfolio equity, debt, and other investment. Further-
more, we nd that countries with stronger productivity growth accumulate signicantly more
reserve assets; this is an important driver of the allocation puzzle.
Second, we rene the aggregate result for FDI in
ows and document substantial sectoral
heterogeneity. Using a new data set of FDI in
ows by sector for 72 emerging market economies
and developing countries, we establish a new set of allocation puzzles for FDI in
ows into some
important sectors of the economy. Specically, in a cross-section of countries' agriculture, con-
struction, tourism and mining/utility sectors, sectors with stronger productivity growth received
less capital in
ows.1 The sector-level allocation puzzles constitute an even starker violation of
the neoclassical growth model than the allocation puzzle for total capital 
ows as they are ob-
served for FDI in
ows, which should comply strongly with the model's predictions. By contrast,
we show that countries with faster productivity growth in manufacturing attract more foreign
investment in that sector. The link is even stronger for most of the service sectors: FDI in
ows
and productivity growth are tightly linked in the business and nance, trade, and transport,
storage and communication sector.
Third, we show that nancial openness plays an important role in the relation between FDI
in
ows and productivity growth: a country with fast productivity growth draws in more FDI
into its service sectors the higher its degree of nancial openness. Financial openness does not
play a role for the other sectors of the economy. We focus on nancial openness because it is
an underlying assumption of the open-economy neoclassical model; a certain degree of nancial
openness is required for capital to 
ow according to its predictions. If countries/sectors were
nancially closed, it would come as no surprise if (sectoral) capital in
ows were not linked to
(sectoral) productivity development; a "failure" of the neoclassical model would then be driven
by a violation of the underlying assumption of nancial openness and not by 
aws in its other
key mechanisms.
1Note that mining and quarrying (Sector C according to the ISIC Rev.3.1 classication) includes the petroleum
sector.
2We oer some thoughts on potential explanations for the sector-level results focusing on the
role of resource endowment and on how the tradability of the nal good, transport costs, and a
xed cost of observing productivity development can cause productivitiy to play a bigger role in
the investment decisions of service sector investors than of manufacturing sector investors. No
attempt is made to explore the dierent explanations theoretically or to empirically discriminate
between them.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the literature. Section 3 presents the
theoretical framework underlying the empirical analysis. Section 4 describes the data. Section 5
scrutinizes the allocation puzzle on the level of the aggregate economy. In Section 6, FDI 
ows
are disaggregated to the sectoral level. Section 7 discusses some tentative explanations for the
results, and section 8 concludes.
2 Literature
This paper relates to the literature on the role of nancial openness and the determinants of
capital 
ows, and their impact on economic development. Through establishing the allocation
puzzle, Gourinchas and Jeanne (2009) cast doubt on the complementarity between foreign capital
and economic growth. In doing so, they oer a conclusion similar to Aizenman et al. (2007)
and Prasad et al. (2007), who nd that developing countries that rely less on foreign nance
grow faster. This establishes a positive relation between domestic savings and growth, which
links these papers to the literature on savings, growth and investment and their interrelations
(Feldstein and Horioka ,1980; Carroll and Weil, 1994). Rodrik and Subramanian (2008) argue
that capital in
ows only have a positive eect in saving-constrained economies; in investment-
constrained economies foreign savings have less benecial eects as they mainly drive up the
real eective exchange rate (RER), which reduces the competitiveness of tradables and is bad
for growth (Rodrik (2008) provides evidence that an overvalued RER reduces growth). With
regard to this literature, we show that the complementarity between foreign nance and growth
depends on the type of capital 
ows, with the complementarity being strongest for FDI in
ows.
This weakens the allocation puzzle. However, we establish a new set of sector-level allocation
puzzles for FDI in
ows, which adds to the doubts on the positive complementarity between
capital in
ows and growth.
With regard to the role of nancial openness, Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2008) suggest - based
on the observation that the standard model explains interstate capital 
ows within the US well
(where there are no restrictions on capital 
ows) - that frictions associated with national borders
may explain the failure of the neoclassical model; in showing that capital 
ows into high-growth
service sectors only when they are nancially open, we arrive at a similar result.
This paper relates also to the growth accounting literature. Hall and Jones (1999) and
Caselli (2004) document the importance of total factor productivity (TFP) as the main source of
cross-country income dierences and, consequently, the importance of TFP growth for economic
convergence. Caselli and Feyrer (2007) demonstrate that the marginal product of capital (MPK)
is quite similar for advanced and developing countries once properly measuring the share of
income accruing to physical capital. Chirinko and Mallick (2008) argue however that, when
3adjustment costs are taken into account and parameterized, the MPK remains higher in poor
countries. Similar to Gourinchas and Jeanne (2009), we do not focus directly on the MPK, but
instead on underlying productivity growth as a determinant of capital 
ows.
The literature oers several potential explanations for the allocation puzzle. One strand fo-
cuses on the role of aggregate and idiosyncratic risk. With regard to aggregate risk, it is often
emphasized that high saving rates in Asian emerging markets are a re
ection of precautionary re-
serves built up to insure against aggregate risks. With regard to idiosyncratic risks, Chamon and
Prasad (2008) explain China's rising household savings through increases in idiosyncratic risks
associated with the transition to a market economy. Benhima (2009) nds that the allocation
puzzle can be explained through introducing idiosyncratic investment risk in the neoclassical
growth model (similarly, Sandri (2009) and Carroll and Jeanne (2008)). Aguiar and Amador
(2009) focus on political factors and foreign debt: in a model featuring political economy fric-
tions and a lack of commitment regarding foreign debt, they show that the allocation puzzle can
be rationalized, as capital will not be invested in an economy with high debt due to the risk
of expropriation; hence, governments have an incentive to pay down debt along a high-growth
transition path. Further studies focus on the role of domestic nancial development. Buera
and Shin (2010) demonstrate that capital out
ows and high TFP growth go hand in hand in a
situation where the government introduces widespread reforms that open up the capital account
and remove domestic distortions, but leave nancial market distortions in place. The reforms
increase TFP growth; entrepreneurs, faced with nancial distortions, send their savings abroad
to self nance their future investments. Similarly, Caballero, Farhi and Gourinchas (2008) show
that, in the absence of a reliable store of value, nancially underdeveloped countries have to
export capital when they grow fast.
By taking a sectoral perspective, this paper oers a so far unexplored avenue of analyzing
the (aggregate) allocation puzzle. Explanations for the sector-level results (resource endowment,
trade and production related factors) can potentially inform studies that aim at explaining the
aggregate allocation puzzle established by Gourinchas and Jeanne (2009). Furthermore, the
sectoral analysis indicates that the sectoral composition of economies is an important factor for
understanding the aggregate allocation puzzle.
3 Conceptual Issues
3.1 A simple neoclassical framework
We illustrate that capital 
ows and productivity growth should be positively related in a simple




2The framework yields similar implications with regard to the relation between productivity and capital 
ows
as the small open economy model built by Gourinchas and Jeanne (2009). Their model is richer and includes
a convergence, initial debt, savings, and investment channel through which debt, the initial capital stock and
productivity growth impact capital in
ows. Here, we focus on the investment channel; the savings channel
captures the saving decision of households rather than the investment/saving decision of rms. We show that the
investment channel can be derived with a small set of assumption within a simple neoclassical framework.
4where Kt is the stock of domestic physical capital, Lt the supply of labour,  the capital share,
and At the productivity level.
Consider N countries (indexed by c) with technology given by (1), identical capital shares
(i.e.  = 1 = 2 = ::: = N), and a constant labour force normalized to 1 (L1;t = L2;t = ::: =
LN;t = 1).3 Assuming a sucient degree of nancial openness, so that capital can 
ow across























It follows that for all countries (c) the percent change of the capital stock equals the percent
change of TFP plus a term that refers to some reference country c = 1:
8c : kc = ac + ' (3)
where lower letters denote logs and ' = k1 a1. If a country experiences stronger productivity
growth than another country, it will experience a relatively stronger increase in its capital stock.5
For simplicity suppose that the link between capital in
ows and kc is linear. Specically, that
capital in






= a + bkc (4)
where we assume b to be positive and the same across countries. A country receives more capital
in
ows (scaled by its size) the larger the percent increase in its capital stock.6
This motivates the following (cross-sectional) regression equation on which (or variations of
3We show the eect of allowing the capital share and the labour force to vary across countries below.
4A bold assumption; i.e. a typical RBC model relies on sucient adjustment costs to t the data.
5If we allow capital shares to vary across countries the equation becomes kc  
1 2
1 1 k1 = ac  
1 2
1 1 a1.
Estimates by Gollin (2002) suggest that the capital share is roughly constant within countries and varies between
0.2 and 0.35 across countries. This implies that the maximum value for
1 2
1 1 is 1.23 ( 0:8
0:65) (if we assume
country 1 to have the higher capital share). To assess the potential bias, assume that both countries display a
productivity growth rate of 1% and that the capital stock of country 2 remains unchanged; then the condition
would imply that the capital stock of country 1 decreases by 0.23 percent (despite equal productivity growth
rates across the two countries). However, we argue that our theoretical prediction is robust to dierences in the
capital share across countries for two reasons. First, the dierences in capital share are generally much lower
than the maximum dierence of 0.15 (see Gollin (2002)); the bias term is accordingly much lower than 1.23 for
most country-pairs. Second, in the empirical section, we analyze the link between capital 
ows and productivity
growth across countries for a long time period. Hence, the dierences in productivity growth across countries are
generally very large (up to 300 percentage points). It follows that the dierences in capital shares are too small
to change the direction of the theoretical prediction.
6A special case of this assumption would be to assume that the world capital stock is xed (i.e. K =
K1 + K2 + ::: + KN), which would imply a one to one (b = 1) link between capital in
ows (scaled by the
initial capital stock) and the growth in the capital stock. Hence, if we assume a capital to output ratio of 3, b is
1
3 for this special case (In the general case, b is between 0 and 1
3).




=  + ac + "c (5)
where  = a + b' and  = b in case the theoretical prediction would hold exactly in the data.
The theoretical prediction is that  is positive - i.e. stronger productivity growth is associated
with stronger capital in
ows. Note that the theoretical prediction remains the same if we allow
the labour force to vary.7 Furthermore, substituting labour productivity growth for TFP growth
(as we do in the sectoral analysis) does also not change the theoretical prediction: yc   lc
can be written as ac + ' using the production function (1) and equation (3).8
In terms of terminology, we refer to a negative statistically signicant relation between capital
in
ows and productivity growth as a \strong" allocation puzzle; a non-signicant relation between
capital in
ows and productivity development - which implies that the coecient is statistically
speaking zero - is called a \weak" allocation puzzle. Note that the theoretical prediction is
derived under the assumption of nancial openness. If capital is not allowed to 
ow freely, the
prediction does not hold; we hence expect  = 0 for fully closed countries.
The theoretical prediction holds without further assumptions when extending the framework
to the sectoral level. Importantly, we do not need to assume that all capital is sector-specic
and that sectors are independent units. First, technological spillovers between sectors - though
entirely possible - do not change the prediction that capital 
ows are driven by underlying
productivity trends (which may or may not be in
uenced by spillovers). Second, because equation
(2) holds across all countries and sectors, it is not essential for the theoretical prediction whether
all capital is sector-specic: whereas the share of capital that is not sector-specic will be simply
drawn into the highest-growth sectors (across all dierent sectors and countries), it remains the
case for one specic sector that low-growth sectors across countries receive fewer in
ows than
high-growth sectors. The crucial assumption for this to be true is that equation (4) holds for
every sector. We believe this to be the case, because FDI is by its nature a direct capital 
ow - i.e.
in
ows of FDI into the manufacturing sector should be positively associated with an increase of
the capital stock in the manufacturing sector; this is especially true for greeneld investments.9
3.2 Interpretation of regression coecients
In the empirical analysis, we do not aim to give the coecient  (see equation (5)) a causal
interpretation. Note that Gourinchas and Jeanne's (2009) interpretation of the allocation puzzle,
as countries with faster productivity growth attracting relatively less capital in
ows (rather
than capital not having a positive eect on productivity growth), is based on the standard
neoclassical model's assumption that technological progress follows an exogenous process; this




=  + 1ac + 2lc with 1 = 2 = b and  = a + b' in
case the theoretical prediction holds exactly in the data.
8It can be shown that this holds both for a constant and variable labour force. Intuitively, this is due to the
fact that the equalization of marginal products determines the link between the capital stock, TFP and the labour
force.
9It is, however, conceivable that the domestic banking system intermediates a share of the FDI in
ows -
especially if direct investment restrictions prevent investors from investing directly in their target sector.
6implicitly assumes that the causality goes from productivity to capital 
ows. They do not
attempt to discriminate between the two possibilities in the data - neither does the evidence we
present. Empirically speaking, we interpret the allocation puzzle hence broadly, as a missing
complementarity between foreign nance and productivity growth. Our regression coecients
should therefore be interpreted accordingly, as capturing this complementarity.
However, it is interesting to consult the literature to assess which side of the complementarity
is likely to be more important. For overall in
ows, the evidence seems to support Gourinchas
and Jeanne (2009)'s interpretation because empirical studies could not establish a convincing
positive eect of net capital in
ows on (per capita) growth (Prasad et al., 2007; Kose et al.,
2006).
This is, however, less clear for FDI: if the eect of FDI in
ows on productivity growth is
stronger than for other types of capital in
ows, positive and signicant regression coecients
could be either interpreted as capturing the productivity impacts of FDI in
ows or as the pull
eect of productivity growth on FDI in
ows. What interpretation should we believe in; i.e. does
FDI cause growth? The answer is not clear-cut. In a recent survey of the literature, Kose et
al. (2006) summarize the major ndings as follows: although earlier studies have found mixed
results, recent studies using more sophisticated methodologies and micro-level data sets, have
been more successful in nding favorable evidence of the benets from FDI.10 Herzer et al. (2008)
nd in a sample of 28 developing countries, using cointegration techniques, that there is neither
a long-term nor a short-term eect of FDI on growth. According to Aykut and Sayek (2007)
one should note with regard to studies on the macro level that they only identify a positive
growth eect of FDI in combination with other factors (such as endowment with human capital
(Borensztein et al., 1998), trade openness (Balasubramanyam et al., 1996) and domestic nancial
market development (Alfaro et al., 2004)). But also this is not without criticism: Rodrik (1999)
and Carkovic and Levine (2003) argue that the eect of FDI on growth is weak11 and that most
of the studies showing an eect of FDI based on initial conditions suer from reverse causality
(which emphasizes causality from productivity to capital 
ows). Aykut and Sayek (2007) show
that the sectoral composition of FDI 
ows matters. If 
ows get skewed towards the manufacturing
sector, there are more positive spillovers to the rest of the economy and the eect on growth is
positive. Overall the results for macro data appear inconclusive, but seem to favour the "pull"
interpretation of our coecients - i.e. productivity growth pulling in FDI 
ows.
It is even more important for the present study to have a look at results from more disag-
gregated studies focusing on the sectoral level: a dierential impact of sectoral FDI on sectoral
productivity growth across sectors can impact the results and their interpretation as the degree
of endogeneity would vary across sectors. Furthermore, evidence of the impact of sectoral FDI
on the productivity growth rates of other sectors should be taken into account. With regard
to productivity spillovers from foreign rms to domestic rms in the same sector, the evidence
is again inconclusive with various studies nding a positive eect and other studies only a very
small eect (Kose et al., 2006). G org and Greenaway (2004) argue that those studies (using
10See Lipsey (2004) and Moran (2005) for further literature surveys.
11Carkovic and Levine (2003) use a dynamic GMM specication to account for endogeneity and claim that the
exogenous component of FDI does not have a causal impact on economic growth.
7cross section data) cannot establish causality because of reverse causality: for example (borrow-
ing their argument), if productivity in the oil sector is higher than in the food sector, foreign
companies may be attracted to the former. The results of a cross-sectional study would then be
biased in favor of a positive impact of FDI on productivity. Furthermore, Kose et al. (2006) give
a potentially important reason for the weak results on horizontal spillovers: foreign rms might
try to protect their rm-specic advantages.
Overall, the results for the sectoral level are inconclusive, but seem to, again, favour the




For the aggregate-level analysis, we construct a dataset containing information on capital 
ows,
TFP and various control variables for 95 emerging markets and developing countries (referred
to as the full sample)13 over the two periods 1980-2007 and 1990-2007. For the sector-level
analysis, we construct two datasets containing sector-level data on (log) FDI in
ows, employment
and value added for 72 emerging markets and developing countries over the (maximum) period
1990-2008 for 3 and 7 sectors.14
We perform the following preliminary screens on the data. First, we exclude observations for
the sectoral data set for which our measure of FDI in
ows or productivity development deviates
by more than 4 standard deviations from the sample mean. This makes sure that no extreme
observation has an undue impact on the results. Second, we exclude sectors that both have a
value-added below USD 100 million and a share in total value-added that is below 1 percent, in
order to focus on sectors that play a signicant role in the respective countries.15 Third, for both
the dataset used in the aggregate-level analysis and the sectoral analysis, we exclude observations
for which we have less than 4 years of data for capital in
ows and productivity development.
Summary statistics are provided in table A1 and A2. This section provides a brief description
of the key variables and discusses important data issues; further details and data sources are
provided in Appendix A; an overview on the sample coverage can be found in Appendix B.
4.1 Capital Flows
Aggregate-level data on the dierent types of capital 
ows is taken from the IMF's International
Financial Statistics (IFS). We measure total net capital in
ows using data on current account
decits. This treats errors and omissions as unreported capital in
ows and includes changes in
12However, vertical productivity spillovers might play an important role and will be harder to deal with: Javorcik
(2004) nds that a 10 percent increase in the foreign presence in downstream sectors is associated with a 0.38
percent increase in output of rms in the supplying industry. If those vertical linkages are across sectors and if
they are quantitatively important one should control for their eect.
13We exclude all high-income countries (based on the income classication from the World Bank) except for
Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong, Israel and the Republic of Korea.
14Sectors are classied according to ISIC Rev. 3.1. See Appendix A1 for an overview on the sectoral composition
of the two data sets. Using a dierent data source on sectoral value-added, we further disaggregate three of the
seven sectors.
15This exclusion is of practical relevance only for the agriculture and the mining sector (C), which are very
small in a few countries.
8reserves assets. Furthermore, we look at the dierent components of the current account and use
data from the balance of payment on net in
ows of FDI, net portfolio equity, net portfolio debt,
net other investment, and reserve assets.16 To distinguish ocial from private capital 
ows, we
derive three alternative measures of total net in
ows through subtracting from total net capital
in
ows (1) the net decrease in reserve assets, (2) aid in
ows and (3) both the net decrease in
reserve assets and aid in
ows. Neglecting potentially important ocial elements of portfolio
debt 
ows, we refer to the third measure as net \private" in
ows. Gross FDI In
ows, dened as
inward net 
ows in the reporting country by non-residents, are also taken from IFS.
Sectoral FDI in
ows stem from several sources including UNCTAD, International Trade Cen-
ter (ITC), ASEAN, OECD, and various country sources (see Appendix A for more details on
the data sources and Appendix B for an overview of the sample).
The capital 
ows series are divided by a de
ator and the price of investment goods given in
the 6.3 PENN World tables (PWT 6.3, Heston et. al (2006)), to get a measure of real 
ows in
purchasing power parity (PPP).17 Following the model presented in section 2.1., this measure is
rst summed up over all available years and then scaled by the initial output/value-added of the
respective country/sector - where initial output is taken from PWT 6.3 (Real GDP per capita
(Constant Prices: Chain Series)) and value-added from the United Nations Statistics Division.18
Table A2 presents summary statistics both for gross FDI in
ows in millions of current USD
and for FDI in
ows (in PPP) as a fraction of initial value added. In terms of current USD,
the business and nance sector (In ISIC Rev. 3.1.: Sectors J and K) received, on average,
most FDI in
ows followed by the manufacturing sector (D). Average FDI 
ows into the mining
sector (C), the transport, storage and communication (I) sector and the trade sector (G) are
also sizeable. Flows to agriculture (AB), utilities (E), construction (F) and tourism (H) are, on
average, smaller. However, there is sizable cross-country variation in the amount of FDI 
ows
received for all the sectors. In percent of value added, mining and utilities, transport storage
and communication as well as the nance and business sector received, on average, more FDI
than the manufacturing sector, whereas the agriculture sector received about 10 times less and
the construction sector 3 times less FDI.
It is instructive to compare total FDI in
ows from the sectoral sample with total FDI in
ows
from IFS. Ideally, the match should be one to one; and the dierences are indeed small: the
correlation between IFS FDI In
ows (scaled by initial GDP) and FDI In
ows from our data
set is 91%. The correlation falls to 70% when including out
ows (hence, using net FDI from
IFS instead of gross FDI in
ows); a drop that is driven by big out
ows for Hong Kong and
Korea. Dierences to the aggregate IFS data have several reasons: subsequent updates of the
data (incorporated in IFS but not in older sectoral data sets), dierent data issuers, dierences
between approved and realized FDI, the lack of sectoral out
ows data, and nally to the fact that
for some countries FDI in
ows had to be backed out from stock data (where valuation eects
might play a role).
16All variables are dened such that a positive sign corresponds to a net in
ow; a positive sign for reserve assets
corresponds hence to a decrease in reserve assets (capital in
ow).
17The results are robust to using the price of output instead.
18Value-added data is scaled by the price of output from PWT 6.3 to get a measure of value added in PPP.
94.2 Productivity
For the aggregate analysis, we construct TFP (At) with the perpetual inventory method using
data from PWT 6.3 on investment and output together with the production function (1) - details
are given in Appendix A3. In order to focus on long-run trends, the TFP series is smoothed by
applying an HP lter with a high smoothing parameter.19
With regard to sectoral productivity development, we rely on labour productivity, which is
calculated as the ratio of value added to the number of workers in the respective sector, as a
proxy for TFP growth (due to missing data on the capital stock for the dierent sectors). As we
showed before, the change of labour productivity equals the change of TFP growth in a simple
neoclassical framework. It is however useful for assessing the results of the empirical analysis to
examine the link between TFP and labour productivity more carefully.
Using the production function (1), labour productivity Y
L can be written as a function of












Changes in labour productivity are only partly driven by changes in TFP. The conclusion with
regard to the relative strength of the allocation puzzle across sectors is, however, independent
of whether it is based on labour productivity growth or TFP growth, as long as the relative
importance of capital deepening is similar for, say, the mining sectors in Brazil and Russia; the
fact, that the importance of capital deepening is likely to dier between, for example, the nance
and mining sector, does not change the ranking of sectors with respect to the presence or non-
presence of sectoral allocation puzzles: within each sector the theoretical prediction (equation
(5)) remains that the country which displays the strongest increase in TFP should receive the
largest amount of FDI in
ows.
Furthermore, we observe that TFP and labour productivity move largely in line when looking
at aggregate data: the correlation coecient between TFP growth and growth in real GDP per
capita (rgdpch from PWT 6.3) is 79% for 1990-2007 using the sectoral sample (82% for the full
sample (from 1980-2007)).
4.3 Financial openness
Our main measure of capital account openness is the index of capital account liberalization
constructed by Quinn (1997, updated to 2006). This is a de jure index measuring capital ac-
count restrictions. It is normalized between 0 and 1 (representing fully closed and fully open
regime, respectively) and is constructed from information contained in the IMFs Annual Report
on Exchange Arrangement and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER). An alternative measure is
taken from Schindler (2009) and captures restrictions on FDI in
ows. Although the measure is
19Specically,  is set to 27:2, so that the gain of the lter is equal to 70 % at the frequency corresponding to
an eight-year cycle. The results are robust to the choice of the smoothing parameter.
10conceptually more relevant, we focus on the Quinn index as its sample coverage is bigger.20
5 The Allocation Puzzle - Aggregate Level
We estimate the following equation:
NetInflowsc = c + 
1TFPGrowthc + Xc + "c
where TFPGrowth is the ratio of the change in TFP to TFP in the rst year of available data.
NetInflows captures the dierent types of (summed) net in
ows scaled by initial GDP.
In table 1 (and the corresponding gure 1), we present the results for the period 1980-2007
and the full country sample.21 In column (1), we regress total net in
ows to initial GDP on
TFP growth and provide clear evidence in favour of the allocation puzzle: countries with higher
productivity growth received signicantly less capital in
ows; column (8) shows that the result
is robust to subtracting aid in
ows from total net in
ows.
Next we disaggregate total net capital in
ows into their dierent components. We nd no
allocation puzzle for FDI: net FDI in
ows are signicantly positively related with TFP growth
(column 2). The point estimate implies that a 10 percentage point increase in TFP raises net FDI
in
ows (to initial GDP) by 4.17 percentage points. In contrast, we observe a \weak" allocation
puzzle for net in
ows of portfolio equity investment, net portfolio debt and net other investments:
the correlation with productivity growth is negative, but not signicant (columns 3, 4 and 5).
For reserves, we nd a \strong" allocation puzzle: countries with stronger productivity growth
accumulate signicantly more reserve assets (column 6). It follows that excluding reserves from
total net capital 
ows weakens the allocation puzzle: the coecient on TFP growth becomes
insignicant (column 7). It is very close to zero if we also exclude aid 
ows from total net capital

ows (column 9). The correlation between net capital 
ows and productivity growth remains
however negative.
We conclude that only FDI 
ows are in line with the predictions of the standard neoclassical
model; the correlation between capital in
ows and productivity growth is zero or negative for all
other types of capital 
ows. With regard to debt and reserve 
ows this result is not surprising:
they tend to be shaped by government decisions and macroeconomic policies to a greater extent
than FDI in
ows. More surprising is the result on portfolio equity 
ows as it is ex ante not clear
whether FDI or portfolio equity investment can be expected to be more linked to productivity
development.22 The results point to the potential importance of export-led growth strategies
in explaining the allocation puzzle: high-growth countries attract FDI into the productive ex-
port industries (which can be seen in the sectoral analysis) and build up reserves to limit the
20Note that data on sectoral openness to FDI 
ows is not available. It is work in progress to build such a
database based on the AREAER.
21We chose to present the point estimates including the large observations that can been spotted directly from
the upper panel of gure 1. The lower panel shows that the results discussed in this section are robust to excluding
observations for which net capital 
ows and TFP growth deviate by more than 2 standard deviations from their
sample mean. Furthermore, the results are very similar if we restrict the sample to the sample used by Gourinchas
and Jeanne (2009).
22A wide literature shows that FDI is determined by various considerations such as gaining market access, tari
jumping and lowering production costs.
11appreciation of the exchange rate.
To pave the way to the sectoral analysis, we zoom in on gross FDI in
ows, the period 1990
to 2007, and the country sample used in the sectoral analysis.23 The regressions presented
in table 2 are hence the aggregate equivalent of the sectoral regressions presented in the next
section.24 In column (1), we nd that the results for gross FDI in
ows are similar to the results
for net FDI in
ows: the relation between FDI in
ows and productivity growth is positive and
signicant. We check whether this nding is robust to adding various control variables. We
rst add two dummy variables that capture level eects, namely a dummy for EU accession
countries and a dummy for nancial centers. As expected, signicantly more FDI is 
owing into
EU accession countries and nancial centers. The point estimate on TFP growth falls slightly
in size, but rises in signicance (column, 2). Second, we add various variables that have been
identied as important determinants of the current account/capital 
ows (see Chinn and Prasad,
2003) as well as a variable, investment prole from the International Country Risk Guide, that
proxies institutional aspects that are of special relevance for FDI in
ows such as the risk of
expropriation. The coecient on TFP growth remains strongly signicant. With regard to the
additional controls, we make the following observations: countries with an initially higher per
capita GDP level experienced more FDI in
ows; in contrast, countries with an initially higher
net foreign asset positions experienced less FDI in
ows; nally, a good investment prole attracts
FDI in
ows. In column (4), we retain the signicant controls: the results are robust. There is
no allocation puzzle for aggregate FDI in
ows. In the next section, we will explore the sectoral
composition of this result - the positive and signicant relation for aggregate FDI 
ows masks
interesting sectoral dierences.
In table 3, we explore the impact of nancial openness on FDI in
ows and the relation between
TFP growth and FDI in
ows. As expected, nancial openness has a positive eect on the amount
of FDI in
ows a country receives (column 1). To assess the eect of openness on the marginal
eect of TFP growth, we include an interaction term between nancial openness and TFP growth.
We observe a large eect of nancial openness: the coecient on TFP growth becomes negative
and insignicant (column 2). There is hence, in line with the theoretical prediction, no relation
between TFP growth and FDI in
ows for fully closed countries. The interaction term is positive,
but not signicant. However, the eect of TFP growth for countries with fully open capital
accounts (oered by the sum of the rst and third coecient) is positive and signicant (the
p-value of the sum is 0.06). In Column (4), we add controls to the regression and the interaction
term turns signicant: the higher the degree of nancial openness, the tighter the link between
FDI in
ows and productivity growth. Columns (5) and (6) show that the results are robust to
using the full sample. We hence nd that nancially closed countries display a \weak" allocation
puzzle even for FDI in
ows. In contrast, nancially open countries do not display an allocation
puzzle. We will examine whether this result is driven by certain sectors or whether nancial
23From the 72 countries of the sectoral sample Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brunei Darussalam, Russia, Serbia and
Tajikistan drop because the initial capital stock cannot be constructed from PWT 6.3 (The series are too short).
There is no IFS data on FDI for Taiwan and not enough FDI data for Guyana.
24We present results with and without control variables as this allows us to compare the aggregate results with
the equivalent unconditional (sector by sector regressions) and conditional (country/sector panel with controls or
xed eects that capture sector-invariant country-level characteristics) regressions of the sectoral analysis.
12openness has a similar impact across sectors.
6 Into the Allocation Puzzle - A Sectoral Analysis
6.1 Empirical Approach
We assess the relation between FDI in
ows and productivity development using both sector-
by-sector regressions in a cross-section of countries and a country/sector panel framework. The
sector-by-sector framework allows assessing the unconditional relation between FDI in
ows and
productivity growth. Specically, we estimate the following equation for each of the sectors
within the 3 and 7-sector framework:
logFDIc =  + 
1ProdGrowthc + "c (6)
where ProdGrowth is dened as the ratio of the change in labour productivity to labour pro-
ductivity in the rst year of available data and logFDI refers to the natural logarithm of the
ratio of summed sectoral FDI in
ows to value-added in the rst year of available data.25
To assess the robustness of the results with regard to accounting for country-specic charac-
teristics, we examine the relation between FDI in
ows and productivity growth also in a coun-
try/sector panel framework. Including country specic eects in such a framework captures, in
fact, all country characteristics that do not change across sectors. Specically, we estimate the
following panel for the 3 and 7-sector dataset:
logFDIc;s = 1Sector1 + ::: + SSectorS + 
1ProdGrowthc;1  Sector1 +
::: + 
SProdGrowthc;S  SectorS + c + "c;s with s=1,...,S (7)
where c is a country specic eect that is potentially correlated with the regressors. Sectoral
FDI in
ows are regressed on sector dummies and an interaction term between productivity de-
velopment and the sector dummies.26 Note that the results of the sector-by-sector regression can
be reproduced in the panel framework by simply running a pooled regression (i.e. not including
random or xed eects). Country specic eects account for all country specic characteristics
that do not change across sectors (for example, it is likely that the eect of broad aspects of
institutional quality - such as law enforcement or bureaucratic quality - is similar across manu-
facturing and transport sectors). Furthermore, purging country xed eects from the regression
using the appropriate within transformation can account for potential omitted variable bias in
25We take the log of FDI in
ows as the dependent variable to dampen the impact of very large observations.
Specically, we add one to the ratio of FDI in
ows over initial value added as this transformation is neutral for
small x, which gives a natural x point (see the discussion in Yeyati et al. (2007)). Results are broadly robust to
not taking logs and are available on request.
26With regard to the model specication, we choose the xed eects framework (over the random eects
framework), as the Hausman test rejects the random eects model for the 7-sector (at the 1% level). For the
3-sector dataset the p-value of the Hausman test is 0.36 and random eects cannot be rejected convincingly. For
the sake of comparability, we still prefer to focus on the xed eects regression also for the 3-sector data set.
Furthermore, the Breusch-Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test, which tests whether the variance of the intercept
component in random eects is zero, i.e. if the xed eects are all the same, rejects its null hypothesis at the 1
% level for both data sets.
13case the xed eects are correlated with sectoral productivity development (as is likely when
thinking about the eect of institutional variables).
Since we can present the data (and hence the sector-by-sector regressions) graphically, we can
assess the robustness of our results to (potentially) in
uential observations directly by comparing
two sets of gures in the gures below: rst, a gure displaying the regression using all the data,
and second, a gure with the title \Focusing in" where we exclude observations for which FDI
in
ows or TFP growth deviate by more than 2 standard deviations from their sample mean.
We choose to focus on the regression results based on including these observations, with one
reason being that the panel regressions including xed eects will account for country specic
level eects.27
6.2 FDI in
ows and productivity growth by sector in a cross-section
of countries
Table 4.1 and the corresponding gure 2 present the results of the sector-by-sector regressions for
the 3-sector data set. For the agricultural sector, we nd a \weak" allocation puzzle: FDI in
ows
and productivity growth are unrelated. The same holds for the industry sector although the cor-
relation between FDI in
ows and productivity growth is stronger than for the agricultural sector.
For the service sector, FDI in
ows and productivity growth are strongly related (signicant at
the 5 % level). The results are qualitatively and quantitatively robust to excluding observations
for which FDI in
ows or productivity growth deviate by more than 2 standard deviations from
the sample mean. The estimated coecient implies a strong link between productivity growth
and FDI in
ows: a 10 percentage point increase in productivity growth in the service sector is
associated with an increase of FDI in
ows to initial GDP by 4.5 percent.
Industry as well as services con
ate the eect of very dierent industries (e.g. resource
extraction vs. manufacturing and transport vs. nancial intermediation and business). We
hence move to the 7-sector framework to shed more light on the dierent subcomponents of the
three main sectors. In table 4.2 and gure 3, we present the results. Splitting up the industry
sector into its components reveals that the lack of a positive signicant relation between FDI
in
ows and productivity growth is driven by a signicantly negative relation for the construction
sector and a negative, but insignicant relation for the mining and utilities sector (note that the
mining sector includes petroleum). In contrast, for manufacturing, the coecient on productivity
growth is positive and signicant. For the services sector, the positive and signicant relation
between productivity growth and FDI in
ows carries over to the trade and tourism sector (GH)
as well as the transport, storage and communication sector (I); the coecient is not signicant
for business, nance and other services (JKLMNOP).
In a next step, we attempt to further disaggregate the mining and utilities, trade and tourism,
and business, nance and other services sectors. Note however, that we have to base this analysis
on a dierent dataset for sectoral value added (based on national accounts data as opposed
27Results are broadly robust to estimating without these observations. As stated, for the sector-by-sector
regressions, all results can be read from gures 2 to 4. For the other specications, we will notify in due course if
regression results without including these observations deviate qualitatively from the results given in the paper.
All results are available on request.
14to estimates from the United Nations Statistics Division); the results are hence not strictly
comparable to the results based on the 7-sector dataset. 28 Furthermore, missing employment
and value-added data for the mining, trade and tourism sector causes the sample to drop below
30 countries for these sectors; the results should be hence interpreted with some caution.
In table 4.3 and gure 4, we present the results. Splitting up the mining and utilities sector
(CE) into its two components shows that the relation between productivity and FDI in
ows is
stronger for the mining sector than for the utilities sector. However, we still observe a \weak"
allocation puzzle for both sectors. Focusing in on trade and tourism (GH) gives an interesting
result: the positive correlation for trade and tourism (GH) appears to be only driven by trade (G);
for tourism (H), we observe a negative relation between productivity growth and FDI in
ows - a
\weak" allocation puzzle. Finally, disaggregating the nance, business and other services sector
(LMNOPQ) into its components reveals a positive and signicant coecient on productivity
growth for the nance and business sector (JK); the estimated coecient implies a strong link
between in
ows and productivity: a 10 percentage point increase in productivity growth is
associated with a 6.6 percent increase in FDI in
ows in percent of initial value added - the link
is even stronger (9 percent) and signicant at the 1 percent level when excluding observations
for which FDI in
ows or productivity growth deviate by more than 2 standard deviations from
the sample mean.
To summarize, we nd a \strong" allocation puzzle for the construction (F) sector. For
agriculture (AB), mining/utilities (CE) and tourism (H), we nd a \weak" allocation puzzle.
The evidence speaks against an allocation puzzle for countries' manufacturing (D), trade (G),
transport/communication (I) and business/nance (JK) sectors. Finally, the point estimates are
from 60 percent (for transport, storage and communication) to nearly 300 percent (nance and
business) higher for the service sectors than for the manufacturing sector.
6.3 FDI in
ows and productivity growth in a country/sector panel
In this section, we assess the robustness of the results to accounting for country-specic eects
by including xed eects into a country/sector panel. Table 5 shows that the results for the
3-sector dataset are very similar to the results of the sector-by-sector regressions. However,
some interesting dierences emerge for the 7-sector setup. First, we nd evidence for a \strong"
allocation puzzle for the agricultural sector; the point estimate is negative and signicant at the
5 percent level.
Second, the positive and signicant relation between FDI in
ows and productivity that we
found for the manufacturing sector breaks down; the coecient is now positive, but not signif-
icant. Accounting for country-specic characteristics reveals hence a \weak" allocation puzzle
for the manufacturing sector.
Third, we nd a positive and signicant relation also for the business, nance and other
services sectors (JKLMNOP). Furthermore, the coecient for the trade and tourism (GH) sector
is still positive, but loses its signicance.
28Note further that the base year, used for the conversion into constant dollars, is 1990 for the 7 sector data set
and 2000 for the sectors which we disaggregate further. Dierences can stem from the fact that the conversion
requires taking the exchange rate of the base year, which can deviate from underlying price trends.
15With regard to mining and utilities and the other service sectors, the results of the coun-
try/sector panel conrm the results of the sector-by-sector regressions. We observe a \weak"
allocation puzzle for the mining and utilities sectors; in contrast the positive and signicant cor-
relation between productivity growth and FDI in
ows remains for the aggregate service sectors
and transport, storage and communication (I): a 10 percentage point increase in productivity
growth increases FDI in
ows to initial GDP by 4.8 percent in the aggregate service sector and
by 1.9 percent in the transport, storage and communications sector (I).
6.4 Robustness: Controlling for Labour
So far we have abstracted from the potential impact of changes in the labour force. As shown,
labour force growth has the same impact on FDI in
ows as productivity growth; both an increase
in TFP and the labour force raises the marginal product of capital.29 Omitting labour force
growth from the regression would cause the coecient on productivity growth to be biased if
labour force growth and productivity growth are correlated. However, tables 6.1 to 6.3 show
that our results are robust to including labour force growth into the regression. The estimated
coecient is in fact larger and more signicant for the trade and tourism sector (GH) as well
as the business, nance and other services sector (JKLMNOPQ), especially when accounting for
country xed eects (table 6.3).
6.5 The role of nancial openness
In this section we assess the impact of nancial openness both on the level of sectoral FDI in
ows
and on the relation between productivity growth and sectoral FDI in
ows.
We found that nancial openness has a positive impact on FDI in
ows on the aggregate
level. In table 7, we examine whether this impact diers across sectors. This is indeed the case.
Financial openness has a positive and signicant impact on FDI in
ows into the agricultural
(AB), trade and tourism (GH) and transport, storage and communication (I) sector; it does not
impact FDI in
ows in the remaining sectors of the economy.
In a next step, we assess the impact of nancial openness on the marginal eect of productivity
growth on FDI in
ows. For this purpose, we add an interaction term between nancial openness
and productivity growth to the sector-by-sector and country/sector panel regressions.30 Tables
8.1 to 8.2 present the results for the sector-by-sector regression. The interaction term is positive
and signicant for the trade and tourism sector (GH), the transport, storage and communication
sector (I), and the aggregate services sector. We nd furthermore the countries with the highest
degree of restrictions display a \weak" allocation puzzle as the coecient on productivity growth
is negative, but not signicant. It follows that a country with fast productivity growth draws
in more FDI into its service sectors only when it is nancially open. Tables 9.1 and 9.2 conrm
the robustness of the result for the aggregate services sector and the trade and tourism sector to




=  + 1ac + 2lc with
1 = 2 = b and  = a + b' in case the theoretical prediction holds exactly in the data.
30We also include sector dummies interacted with openness and sector dummies interacted with productivity
growth.
16accounting for country characteristics; the coecient for the transport sector (I) is not robust.
The coecient that measures the impact of productivity growth for the countries with the highest
degree of capital account restrictions ("Sector*ProdGrowth") is now negative and signicant - we
nd hence a\strong" allocation puzzle for this group of countries. Finally, Tables 10.1 and 10.2
show that the results on the interaction terms are robust to using a dierent, more FDI-specic
measure of nancial openness - specically, the index on FDI in
ow restrictions developed by
Schindler (2009).
We conclude that nancial openness has an impact on the level of FDI in
ows in the agricul-
ture and the service sectors, whereas it impacts (positively) the relation between productivity
growth and FDI in
ows only for the service sectors; nancial openness does not play a role in
the remaining sectors of the economy.
Insofar as investment in agriculture (AB) and mining/utilities (CE) is less driven by market
incentives but more by resource security considerations and special contracts between the source
and the host countries - i.e. special investment regimes - the results t to prior expectations.
Interesting is the dierence in the impact of nancial openness between the manufacturing
(D) sector and the service sectors. We see two potential explanations. First, the result might
re
ect the broad macroeconomic framework adopted by some countries. Consider governments
maintaining regulations on capital account transactions while attempting to achieve a manu-
facturing based export-led growth strategy. FDI into the manufacturing sector is then actively
encouraged and often targets special investment zones, which are used by countries to attract
FDI, "circumventing" a generally high level of capital account and direct investment restrictions.
By contrast, consider countries that broadly lift controls on the capital account. This is often
associated with more extensive liberalizing measures, which include the reduction of investment
restrictions in sectors that are traditionally shielded from foreign competition (i.e. the service
sectors) - consider for example the experience of South Korea after the Asian crisis or the experi-
ence of the Eastern European accession countries. In this case, nancial openness would, indeed,
only have an impact on FDI 
ows into the service sectors.31 A second potential explanation is
that countries are generally more open to FDI in
ows into their manufacturing sectors, but that
there are big cross-country dierences with regard to openness towards FDI in
ows into sensitive
industries (such as the nancial sector).32 It will be up to future research to build a suitable
index of nancial openness by sector to rene this analysis.
7 Discussion
This paper focuses on establishing a new set of stylized facts with regard to the relation of
FDI in
ows and productivity growth in the main sectors of the economy. To discriminate -
theoretically or empirically - between the variety of potential explanations is subject to future
research. However, to conclude, we discuss the potential role of resource endowment in explaining
our ndings with regard to the presence of sectoral allocation puzzles as well as the role of trade
31This is, of course, subject to a more rigorous empirical analysis which is left to future research.
32Hence, there would be not enough variation to identify the eect of dierences in nancial openness on FDI
in
ows into the manufacturing sector.
17and production related factors in explaining the fact that the estimated correlations are higher
for the service sectors than for the manufacturing sector.
Resource endowment is likely to play a key role in all the sectors that display an allocation
puzzle. Specically, there are two channels through which resource endowment might have
an eect. First, investment in e.g. the petroleum sector is characterized by very high xed
costs and its long-term nature. This limits the ability of foreign investors to reallocate 
ows to
dierent countries; investors are likely to stay even in phases of low productivity growth. Second,
the output of agriculture and mining/petroleum/utilities sectors (CE) is of a high strategic
importance. Consider for example FDI in
ows into the agricultural sectors of many developing
countries with the goal to achieve food security, or FDI into countries' mining/petroleum/utilities
sectors to secure the resource inputs for the manufacturing industries of the foreign investor. In
such cases, politics may play a more important role and might trump economic considerations
such as productivity growth and the return of investment.
Considerations related to the tradability of the nal good might explain the fact that the
estimated correlations between FDI in
ows and productivity growth are far higher for the ser-
vice sectors than for the manufacturing sector. Consider for example an investor who decides
between investing and exporting in a model that features a xed cost to observe which coun-
try/sector/company is the best to invest in. In case tari-barriers and transportation costs are
not too high, a manufacturing sector investor will decide on saving the xed cost and base her/his
business model on exporting directly. FDI into manufacturing would then be driven by secondary
considerations and it will not be worth for the investor to incur the xed costs of nding the best
investment opportunities. Furthermore, the manufacturing sector investor can always retreat to
her/his domestic manufacturing base and keep on exporting to the country in case the investment
does not turn out to be successful - the risks are then subsequently smaller. It follows that there
is only a weak link between productivity growth and FDI in
ows into manufacturing industries.
On the contrary, given the intangibility and non-tradability of the goods, a service sector investor
has to enter the market directly, incurring huge risks. Hence, paying the xed costs of observing
sectoral productivity developments and identifying the best investment opportunity is essential
and carries much bigger benets. It follows that a service sector investor would only invest in a
country's service sector if (privately observed) productivity growth is strong. Consequently, the
link between productivity and FDI in
ows into the service sector would be stronger than for the
manufacturing sector.
8 Conclusion
This paper assesses the allocation puzzle - the tendency for capital to 
ow to countries with
relatively low productivity growth - by focusing on FDI in
ows, which should be particularly
sensitive to productivity prospects. We show that FDI in
ows and productivity growth are
tightly linked across countries on the aggregate level. Using a new database, we, however, docu-
ment substantial sectoral heterogeneity and establish a new set of stylized facts. Specically, we
nd that the correlation between FDI in
ows and productivity growth is negative in the agri-
culture, mining/utilities, construction and tourism sector. These sector-level allocation puzzles
18constitute an even starker violation of the neoclassical growth model than the allocation puzzle
for total capital 
ows as they are observed for FDI in
ows, which should comply most with
the model's predictions. By contrast, we show that countries with faster productivity growth
in manufacturing attract more investment in that sector. The correlations are even stronger
for the service sectors, both with regard to their size and signicance; FDI in
ows and produc-
tivity growth are tightly linked in the business and nance, trade, and transport, storage and
communication sector.
The results shed some light on the allocation puzzle for total capital 
ows observed on the
aggregate level; they indicate that the sectoral composition of economies matters for the link
between capital 
ows and productivity growth: countries where sectors for which we document
an allocation puzzle play a dominant role might contribute to the weak link between productivity
growth and capital in
ows observed on the aggregate level. It would be interesting to know more
about the sectoral composition of other types of capital 
ows to explore this point further.
We also document a role for nancial openness: a country with fast productivity growth draws
in more FDI into its service sectors only when it is nancially open. The aggregate indices, that
we used, are however quite crude measures of nancial openness on a sectoral level. There are
more investment restrictions in agriculture or the nancial sector than in the manufacturing
sector.33 It is subject to future research to build a dataset that captures nancial openness on
the sectoral level.
We brie
y discuss several channels that might explain the sector-level results. To theoretically
account for resource endowment or trade and production related factors would require deviations
from the simple neoclassical framework we outlined. On the contrary, the results on nancial
openness (one of the model's underlying assumptions) show that the data matches the predictions
of the model more closely once capital is allowed to 
ow freely. Finally, the sector-level results
indicate that it would be worthwhile to take a closer look at the sectoral setup of economies to
understand results documented at the aggregate level.
33This claim is based on the information on direct investment restrictions contained in the IMF's Annual Report
on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER)
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Note: TFP growth (X-Axis) is dened as the ratio of the change in TFP to TFP in the rst year of available
data. Net Capital In
ows (in PPP) are expressed as the ratio of their sum over the years of available data to
GDP in the rst year of available data; if the ratio is 1 a country received - over the sample period - capital
in
ows worth 100 percent of its initial GDP. In the lower panel we exclude observations for which net 
ows
or TFP growth deviate by more than 2 standard deviations from the sample mean. Regression is on the full
country sample (which excludes high income countries, see Appendix B).
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Note: Productivity Growth (X-Axis) is dened as the ratio of the change in labour productivity to labour
productivity in the rst year of available data. FDI in
ows (Y-Axis) are expressed as the (log of) the ratio
of their sum to value added in the rst year of available data. In the gures titled "Focusing in" we exclude
observations for which FDI in
ows or TFP growth deviate by more than 2 standard deviations from the sample
mean. Industry refers to the sectors mining and quarrying (C), manufacturing (D), utilities (E) and construction
(F) according to the ISIC Rev. 3.1 classication. Services includes trade (G), tourism (H), transport, storage
and communications (I), nance and business (JK) and other services (LMNOPQ). See Appendix A1 for more
details on the composition of the sectors.
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Note: Productivity Growth (X-Axis) is dened as the ratio of the change in labour productivity to labour
productivity in the rst year of available data. FDI in
ows (Y-Axis) are expressed as the (log of) the ratio
of their sum to value added in the rst year of available data. In the gures titled "Focusing in" we exclude
observations for which FDI in
ows or TFP growth deviate by more than 2 standard deviations from the sample
mean. See Appendix A1 for more details on the composition of the sectors.
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Note: Productivity Growth (X-Axis) is dened as the ratio of the change in labour productivity to labour
productivity in the rst year of available data. FDI in
ows (Y-Axis) are expressed as the (log of) the ratio
of their sum to value added in the rst year of available data. In the gures titled "Focusing in" we exclude
observations for which FDI in
ows or TFP growth deviate by more than 2 standard deviations from the sample
mean. See Appendix A1 for more details on the composition of the sectors.
26Table 1. Net Capital In
ows and TFP Growth (All countries, 1980-2007)
Total FDI Equity Debt OtherInv. Reserves Excl. Res Excl. Aid Private
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
TFP growth -.919
 .417
 -.177 -.099 -.263 -.684
 -.268 -.657
 -.010
(.415) (.157) (.203) (.066) (.175) (.236) (.231) (.333) (.189)
Const. 1.993
 .056 .162 .105 .209 .214 1.712
 .123 -.158
(.507) (.175) (.229) (.067) (.204) (.271) (.357) (.387) (.278)
Countries 95 94 93 93 95 97 95 93 93
R
2 .122 .182 .045 .053 .053 .247 .019 .083 .00005
Note: In column (1), the dependent variable is the ratio of summed total net in
ows (measured using data
on current account decits) to initial GDP; in column (2), the ratio of net FDI in
ows to initial GDP; in
column (3), the ratio of net portfolio equity investment in
ows to initial GDP; in column (4), the ratio of net
portfolio debt in
ows to initial GDP; in column (5), the ratio of net other investment in
ows; in column (6),
the ratio of the net decrease of reserve assets to initial GDP; in column (7) the ratio of total net in
ows minus
the net decrease of reserve assets to initial GDP; in column (8), the ratio of total net in
ows minus foreign
aid in
ows to initial GDP; in column (9), we subtract both the net decrease of reserve assets and foreign aid
in
ows from total net in
ows. TFP growth is dened as the ratio of the change in TFP to TFP in the rst
year of available data. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. Regression is on the full sample (see
Appendix B).
Table 2. FDI In
ows and TFP Growth (Sectoral Sample, 1990-2007)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
TFP growth .563 .438 .512 .504
(.232) (.133) (.155) (.095)
Financial center 4.064 3.236 3.724
(1.025) (.798) (.875)
EU Accession .233 .270
(.138) (.263)
Log Initial GDP (PPP per capita) .268 .184
(.109) (.060)
Fiscal Balance to GDP 4.722
(3.464)




Initial NFA to GDP -.170 -.143
(.040) (.042)
Oil trade balance to GDP .123
(.786)
Per capita real GDP growth 1.852
(4.621)
Investment Prole .096 .143
(.050) (.047)
Const. .014 .038 -1.438 -1.536
(.288) (.188) (.492) (.357)
Obs./Countries 65 65 56 57
R2 .097 .616 .841 .821
Note: The dependent variable is the ratio of (summed) gross FDI in
ows to initial GDP. TFP growth is
dened as the ratio of the change in TFP to TFP in the rst year of available data. The explanatory variables
are averaged over 1990-2007 (except when stated otherwise). Initial refers to the rst year of available data.
See the appendix for a precise denition of the other variables. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity.
Regression is on the sectoral sample (see Appendix B).
27Table 3. The role of nancial openness (1990-2007)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
TFP growth .677 -.484 .489 .043 .414 -.195
(.234) (.614) (.149) (.259) (.162) (.277)
Capital Account Openness 1.726 -1.311 .228 -.811 .439 -.958
(.723) (1.614) (.276) (.627) (.268) (.609)
TFP growth*Openness 2.004 .713 1.018
(1.393) (.396) (.422)
Controls NO NO YES YES YES YES
Sample Sec. Sec. Sec. Sec. Full Full
Countries 58 58 53 53 74 74
R2 .262 .333 .866 .872 .785 .801
Note: The dependent variable is the ratio of (summed) gross FDI in
ows to initial GDP. TFP growth is
dened as the ratio of the change in TFP to TFP in the rst year of available data. Capital Account Openness
is an index normalized between 0 and 1 (1 for fully open countries); it is averaged over 1990-2007. If indicated,
we use the same control variables as in table 2, column (3). Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity.
Regression is on the sectoral sample in columns (1) through (4) and on the full sample in columns (5) to (6)
(see Appendix B).
Table 4.1. FDI in
ows and productivity growth - 3 Sectors
Agriculture Industry Services
(1) (2) (3)
Const. .049 .495 .332
(.018) (.066) (.049)
ProdGrowth .008 .114 .452
(.022) (.120) (.213)
Countries 57 55 53
R2 .002 .016 .112
Table 4.2. FDI in
ows and productivity growth - 7 Sectors
AB CE D F GH I JKLMNOP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Const. .049 .880 .384 .232 .306 .358 .380
(.018) (.145) (.057) (.045) (.054) (.069) (.070)
ProdGrowth .008 -.089 .173 -.163 .298 .291 .298
(.022) (.128) (.071) (.097) (.141) (.119) (.316)
Countries 57 43 56 50 47 49 53
R2 .002 .007 .083 .053 .102 .109 .026
Table 4.3. FDI in
ows and productivity growth - Disaggregating further
C E G H JK LMNOP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Const. .559 .583 .185 .216 .620 .034
(.134) (.146) (.065) (.058) (.073) (.009)
ProdGrowth .213 .052 .563 -.230 .658 -.029
(.138) (.182) (.146) (.204) (.295) (.020)
Countries 29 32 25 20 41 47
R2 .052 .002 .258 .073 .187 .024
Tables 4.1 to 4.3. Note: The dependent variable is the log of the ratio of (summed) sectoral FDI in
ows
to value added in the rst year of available data. Productivity growth (ProdGrowth) is dened as the ratio of
the change in labour productivity to labour productivity in the rst year of available data. According to the
ISIC Rev. 3.1 classication: Agriculture (AB); Industry refers to the sectors mining and quarrying (C), man-
ufacturing (D), utilities (E) and construction (F); Services includes trade (G), tourism (H), transport, storage
and communications (I), nance and business (JK) and other services (LMNOPQ). See Appendix A1 for more
details on the composition of the sectors. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity.
28Table 5. FDI in
ows and productivity growth (Country/Sector-Panel)























Note: The dependent variable is the log of the ratio of (summed) sectoral FDI in
ows to value added in
the rst year of available data. Productivity growth (ProdGrowth) is dened as the ratio of the change in
labour productivity to labour productivity in the rst year of available data. The regression (see equation
(7)) includes country xed eects, sector dummies and a constant. According to the ISIC Rev.3.1 classica-
tion: Agriculture (AB), Mining and quarrying (C), Manufacturing (D), Utilities (E), Construction (F), Trade
and Tourism (GH), Transport, storage and communications (I), Finance and business (JK) and other services
(LMNOPQ). Industry refers to sectors CDEF and services to sectors GHIJKLMNOPQ. See Appendix A1 for
more details on the composition of the sectors. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity.
29Table 6.1 Including Labour Force Growth - 3 Sectors
Agriculture Industry Services
(1) (2) (3)
Const. .025 .399 .314
(.013) (.096) (.082)
ProdGrowth .021 .204 .487
(.021) (.152) (.285)
LabourGrowth .003 .219 .022
(.0008) (.200) (.049)
Countries 49 55 53
R2 .057 .056 .114
Table 6.2 Including Labour Force Growth - 7 Sectors
AB CE D F GH I JKLMNOP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Const. .025 .849 .373 .227 .077 .301 .296
(.013) (.161) (.077) (.062) (.089) (.105) (.110)
ProdGrowth .021 -.059 .182 -.159 .535 .306 .393
(.021) (.152) (.081) (.101) (.183) (.124) (.356)
LabourGrowth .003 .136 .040 .008 .323 .158 .195
(.0008) (.338) (.129) (.067) (.124) (.175) (.196)
Countries 49 43 56 50 47 49 53
R2 .057 .012 .085 .053 .192 .124 .04
Tables 6.1 to 6.2. Note: The dependent variable is the log of the ratio of (summed) sectoral FDI in
ows
to value added in the rst year of available data. Productivity growth (ProdGrowth)/Labour Force Growth
(Labour Growth) is dened as the ratio of the change in labour productivity/the labour force to labour pro-
ductivity/the labour force in the rst year of available data. According to the ISIC Rev. 3.1 classication:
Agriculture (AB); Industry refers to the sectors mining and quarrying (C), manufacturing (D), utilities (E) and
construction (F); Services includes trade (G), tourism (H), transport, storage and communications (I), nance
and business (JK) and other services (LMNOPQ). See Appendix A1 for more details on the composition of the
sectors. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity.
30Table 6.3 Including Labour Force Growth (Country/Sector-Panel)









































Note: The dependent variable is the log of the ratio of (summed) sectoral FDI in
ows to value added in
the rst year of available data. Productivity growth (ProdGrowth)/Labour Force Growth (Labour Growth) is
dened as the ratio of the change in labour productivity/the labour force to labour productivity/the labour
force in the rst year of available data. The regression (see equation (7)) includes country xed eects, sector
dummies and a constant. According to the ISIC Rev.3.1 classication: Agriculture (AB), Mining and quar-
rying (C), Manufacturing (D), Utilities (E), Construction (F), Trade and Tourism (GH), Transport, storage
and communications (I), Finance and business (JK) and other services (LMNOPQ). Industry refers to sectors
CDEF and services to sectors GHIJKLMNOPQ. See Appendix A1 for more details on the composition of the
sectors. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity.
31Table 7. The impact of nancial openness on the level of FDI in
ows - 7 Sectors
AB CE D F GH I JKLMNOP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Const. -.036 .458 .235 .025 -.083 -.028 .015
(.025) (.378) (.157) (.112) (.145) (.146) (.196)
ProdGrowth .002 -.023 .175 -.214 .251 .329 .281
(.030) (.132) (.078) (.099) (.132) (.120) (.279)
Capital Account Openness .119 .586 .202 .272 .587 .498 .521
(.062) (.503) (.249) (.185) (.224) (.204) (.291)
Countries 46 36 49 44 40 42 47
R2 .12 .038 .112 .141 .204 .209 .097
Table 8.1. The role of nancial openness - 3 Sectors (Sector-by-Sector)
Agriculture Industry Services
(1) (2) (3)
Const. -.071 .206 .111
(.039) (.149) (.159)
ProdGrowth .091 .495 -.626
(.081) (.339) (.550)
Capital Account Openness .169 .381 .332
(.074) (.231) (.226)
ProdGrowth*Openness -.117 -.505 1.416
(.082) (.423) (.670)
Countries 46 48 45
R2 .146 .063 .293
Table 8.2. The role of nancial openness - 7 Sectors (Sector-by-Sector)
AB CE D F GH I JKLMNOP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Const. -.071 .310 .233 .008 .026 .198 .080
(.039) (.422) (.152) (.111) (.133) (.203) (.195)
ProdGrowth .091 .190 .179 .015 -.492 -.202 -.059
(.081) (.258) (.318) (.181) (.314) (.364) (.791)
Capital Account Openness .169 .832 .204 .298 .434 .173 .429
(.074) (.666) (.243) (.190) (.211) (.274) (.311)
ProdGrowth*Openness -.117 -.396 -.006 -.289 .951 .778 .476
(.082) (.601) (.394) (.293) (.443) (.458) (1.156)
Countries 46 36 49 44 40 42 47
R2 .146 .047 .112 .153 .26 .242 .101
Tables 7 to 8.2 Note: The dependent variable is the log of the ratio of (summed) sectoral FDI in
ows to
value added in the rst year of available data. Productivity growth (ProdGrowth) is dened as the ratio of
the change in labour productivity to labour productivity in the rst year of available data. Capital Account
Openness is an index normalized between 0 and 1 (1 for fully open countries; see Appendix); it is averaged over
the years of available data. According to the ISIC Rev. 3.1 classication: Agriculture (AB); Industry refers to
the sectors mining and quarrying (C), manufacturing (D), utilities (E) and construction (F); Services includes
trade (G), tourism (H), transport, storage and communications (I), nance and business (JK) and other services
(LMNOPQ). See Appendix A1 for more details on the composition of the sectors. Standard errors are robust
to heteroskedasticity.
32Table 9.1. The role of nancial openness - 3 Sectors (Country/Sector-Panel)
Agriculture Industry Services
(1) (2) (3)
Sector*ProdGrowth .088 .241 -.799
(.394) (.352) (.390)






Table 9.2. The role of nancial openness - 7 Sectors (Country/Sector-Panel)
AB CE D F GH I JKLMNOPQ
Sector*ProdGrowth .106 .148 -.024 -.028 -.441 -.246 -.281
(.287) (.245) (.301) (.189) (.272) (.285) (.454)
Sector*ProdGrowth*Openness -.274 -.269 .143 .013 .719 .630 .972





Tables 8.1 to 8.2 Note: The table is based on a regression of FDI In
ows on sector dummies (not shown),
sector dummies interacted with openness (not shown), sector dummies interacted with productivity growth and
sector dummies interacted with productivity growth and openness. The dependent variable is the log of the
ratio of (summed) sectoral FDI in
ows to value added in the rst year of available data. Productivity growth
(ProdGrowth) is dened as the ratio of the change in labour productivity to labour productivity in the rst year
of available data. Capital Account Openness is an index normalized between 0 and 1 (1 for fully open countries;
see Appendix); it is averaged over the years of available data. According to the ISIC Rev. 3.1 classication:
Agriculture (AB); Industry refers to the sectors mining and quarrying (C), manufacturing (D), utilities (E) and
construction (F); Services includes trade (G), tourism (H), transport, storage and communications (I), nance
and business (JK) and other services (LMNOPQ). See Appendix A1 for more details on the composition of the
sectors. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity.
33Table 10.1. Openness to FDI- 3 Sectors (Sector-by-Sector)
Agriculture Industry Services
(1) (2) (3)
Const. -.039 .254 .267
(.033) (.131) (.099)
ProdGrowth .109 .232 -.249
(.083) (.205) (.152)
FDI Openness .103 .301 .179
(.045) (.184) (.137)
FDI Openness*ProdGrowth -.111 -.173 .951
(.080) (.307) (.282)
Countries. 35 37 35
R2 .125 .065 .275
Table 10.2. Openness to FDI - 7 Sectors (Sector-by-Sector)
AB CE D F GH I JKLMNOP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Const. -.039 .642 .058 .057 .166 .326 .237
(.033) (.418) (.162) (.052) (.078) (.139) (.073)
ProdGrowth .109 .003 .478 -.064 -.269 -.039 -.183
(.083) (.179) (.338) (.120) (.150) (.211) (.094)
FDI Openness .103 .281 .386 .259 .311 -.019 .276
(.045) (.460) (.190) (.111) (.159) (.170) (.151)
FDI Openness*ProdGrowth -.111 -.141 -.271 -.279 .605 .501 .502
(.080) (.323) (.389) (.271) (.325) (.214) (.446)
Countries 35 29 39 35 31 34 37
R2 .125 .021 .175 .244 .266 .197 .116
Tables 9.1 to 9.2 Note: The dependent variable is the log of the ratio of (summed) sectoral FDI in
ows to
value added in the rst year of available data. Productivity growth (ProdGrowth) is dened as the ratio of
the change in labour productivity to labour productivity in the rst year of available data. FDI Openness is a
dummy that is equal to 1 if a country maintains no restrictions on FDI in
ows (0 otherwise); it is averaged over
the years of available data. According to the ISIC Rev. 3.1 classication: Agriculture (AB); Industry refers to
the sectors mining and quarrying (C), manufacturing (D), utilities (E) and construction (F); Services includes
trade (G), tourism (H), transport, storage and communications (I), nance and business (JK) and other services





The following table gives an overview on the sub-sectors covered by the 2 data sets used in the analysis:
Data Set Sub-Sectors
3 sectors Agriculture (AB), Industry (CDEF) and Services (GHIJKLMNOPQ)
7 sectors AB, CE, D, F, GH, I, JKLMNOP
According to the ISIC Rev.3.1 classication: Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing (AB), Mining and
Quarrying (C), Manufacturing (D), Electricity, Gas and Water Supply [Utilities] (E), Construction (F), Whole-
sale and Retail Trade and Repair of Motor Vehicles, Motorcycles, Personal and Household Goods [Trade] (G),
Hotels and Restaurants [Tourism] (H), Transport, Storage and Communications (I), Financial Intermediation
(J), Real Estate Activities, Renting and Business Activities [Business] (K) and Government, Community, Social
and Personal Services [Other Services] (LMNOPQ).
A2. Sectoral FDI In
ows
Sector-level data on FDI in
ows stems from several sources. The UNCTAD FDI country proles include
data on various countries; the level of sectoral disaggregation is quite high (data is present for most of
the ISIC Rev. 3.1 or ISIC Rev. 2. level-two sub-sectors). These data are extended with data from
the International Trade Center (ITC), which provides data for more recent years. The Association
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) provides data for some Asian countries starting in 1999. The
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) gives detailed data for its member
states of which the Czech Republic, Hungary, Iceland, Korea (Republic of), Mexico, Poland, Slovenia
and Turkey are included in the sectoral sample; 22 other OECD countries, for which FDI in
ows data
are available, are not included in the sectoral sample. Various country sources are used to increase
the country coverage, ll the gaps, and increase the length of the data base. Overall, sectoral capital

ows data of dierent degrees of aggregation between 1990 and 2008 are obtained for 72 countries from
Latin America, Asia, Africa and Eastern and Central Europe (see Appendix B2 for the exact sample
coverage).
While building the data set various issues had to be confronted. First, if data is indicated as
\missing" for one sector, but there is information for total 
ows that complies with IFS data and
unspecied 
ows are small or zero: then in
ows for this sector are set to zero. If unspecied 
ows are
large and it cannot be excluded whether unspecied contains data for the sector in question: in
ows
are set to missing for this sector.
Second, for various countries 
ows data is missing but stock data is available; in those cases 
ows
are backed out from stocks. Data is (mainly or partly) based on stocks for the following countries:
Bangladesh, Botswana, Cambodia, Macedonia, Madagascar, Peru, Russia, Slovenia, South Africa,
Swaziland, Tajikistan and Ukraine. Due to the potential impact of valuation eects the regressions
are estimated without these countries in a robustness check (results are robust and available on re-
quest). Furthermore, note that the method yields negative in
ows for some observations (when the
stock of FDI declines); however, data which are based on in
ows can also contain negative numbers
due to prot repatriation etc.
Third, for conversion into dollars the average annual dollar exchange rate from IFS is used. Fourth,
the data for Mongolia, Mozambique, Russia and Taiwan refers to approved investment and, conse-
quently, the data for these countries diverges from the IFS data, which captures realized investment.
A3. Aggregate Level: Productivity Data
To construct TFP (At), we rst derive the capital stock Kt with the perpetual inventory method using
data from the 6.3 PENN World tables (PWT 6.3, Heston et. al (2006)) on investment and output (see
Caselli (2004)). The perpetual inventory method determines the initial capital stock with the formula
for the capital stock in the steady state of the Solow model: K0 = I0
+g where g is the geometric average
of investment growth rates for the rst years of data and  is the depreciation rate. Following the
literature, we assume a  of 6 percent, a capital share  of 0.3, and calculate g using the rst 15 years
of data. Having calculated the initial capital stock, we derive the whole path of the capital stock using
data on investment 
ows from PWT 6.3. The production function (1) is then used to back out the
level of technology and consequently TFP growth.
35A decision has to be taken with regard to whether using the capital stock per worker, per capita or
per working-age capita. Following Gourinchas and Jeanne (2009) we use capital stock per working-age
capita. (For Taiwan and Seychelles capital per worker from PWT 6.3. is used due to missing WDI
data.) The results are qualitatively and quantitatively robust to choosing the other measure.
A4. Sectoral Level: Productivity Data
Sectoral labour productivity data is constructed by dividing the value-added of the respective sector
by the numbers of workers. Employment data are taken from the International Labour Organisation
(ILO) - they are available for most countries for all level-two ISIC Rev. 3. or ISIC Rev. 2. sub-sectors.
Disaggregated value-added data are taken from the United Nations Statistics Division (UNSD).
Specically, we use the UNSD estimates of gross-value by kind of economic activity at constant (1990)
prices for 6 sectors of the economy. As the data contain information on value-added for mining,
manufacturing and utilities (CDE) as well as separate data on manufacturing (D), it is possible to
derive a 7-sector dataset that contains value-added for mining and utilities (CE) and Manufacturing
(D) separately. To further disaggregate some of the sectors, we also use data from UNSD that are based
on ocial national accounts country data. Specically, we obtain disaggregated value-added data for
mining (C), utilities (E), business and nance (JK), trade (G) and tourism (H) both in constant and
current local currency. We transform this data into constant 2000 Dollars using the average dollar
exchange rate (from IFS) of the base year; the ocial country data is too short for many countries to
obtain data in constant 1990 Dollars.
The employment and productivity data are complemented with data from the World Development
Indicators (mainly for agricultural productivity which is directly supplied by this database) and data
from the Groningen Growth and Development Center's (GGDC) 10-sector database (Timmer and Vries
(2007)).
A5. Other variables
Index of Capital Account Openness: Our preferred measure of nancial openness is from Quinn (1997,
updated to 2006) and measures restrictions on capital account transactions. The index, which is nor-
malized between 0 and 1 (1 for fully open countries), is based on the IMFs Annual Report on Exchange
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER).
FDI Openness: Openness to FDI in
ows data are taken from Schindler (2009). Specically, we use
the 0/1 dummy variable "direct investment in
ow restrictions", which is 1 if a country maintains no
restrictions to FDI in
ows.
Net foreign assets/GDP: Net foreign assets (NFA) are from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007). If there is
no NFA data for a given country we use the cumulative current account.
Investment prole: To measure institutional quality, we use the indicator "Investment prole" from
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). It has three subcomponents: (Risks to) Contract Viabil-
ity/Expropriation, Prots Repatriation and Payment Delays. The indicator ranges from 0 to 12; higher
values stand for a better Investment Prole.
General Government Balance (GGB)/GDP: The general government balance relative to GDP, using
the central government balance for countries where the general balance is not available. The data
are from the world economic outlook data base (WEO). The variable is expressed in deviations from
trading partners.
Real per capita GDP growth: The growth rate of GDP per capita (in PPP) is taken from PWT 6.3.
Population growth: The population growth data (expressed in percentage points) are computed from
World Bank data, extended with UN projections. It is expressed in deviations from trading partners.
Old-age dependency ratio: The old-age dependency ratio captures the share of people older than 64,
relative to the working age population, dened as the age group 15-64. The data are based on UN
data, annualized by the World Bank. The variable is expressed in deviations from trading partners.
Initial GDP (PPP per capita): Real GDP per capita (Constant Prices: Chain Series) from the PENN
World Tables 6.3 (Heston et al. (2006)). The variable is expressed in thousands of international Dollars.
Oil trade balance/GDP: The oil trade balance to GDP ratio is from WEO.
Financial Center: Dummy that is equal to 1 if a country is a nancial center. For the sectoral sample,
only Hong Kong and Singapore are nancial centers.
EU Accession: Dummy that is equal to 1 if a country had (at some point in the sample period) the
status of an ocial EU accession candidate.
The weighting matrix is used to place variables in deviations from trading partners. It is constructed
using data from the IMF's Department of Trade Statistics'(DOTS) database. Specically, for every
36country, the trade partner's share in exports is calculated for 1980 and 2006. This gives two matrices,
which are interpolated between 1980 and 2006.
B. Samples
B1. Full Sample
The database includes data since 1980 for all countries with a population larger than one million. We
exclude all high-income countries (based on the income classication from the World Bank as of 2006)
except for Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong, Israel and Republic of Korea. Overall, 121 countries are
included in the database - due to data limitations with respect to net capital 
ows and TFP (built
from PWT 6.3) the nal sample size is 95.
B2. Sectoral Sample: Availability of FDI in
ows data
72 Emerging Markets and Developing Countries (including 8 OECD countries): Argentina
(1992-2007), Armenia (1998-2007), Azerbaijan (1995-2007), Bangladesh (1998-2008), Bolivia (1990-
2008), Bosnia & Herzegovina (2004-2008), Botswana (1998-2007), Brazil (1996-2008), Brunei Darus-
salam (1999-2005), Bulgaria (1998-2008), Cambodia (1999-2008), Chile (1985-2008), China (1997-2007),
Colombia (1994-2008), Costa Rica (1992-2008), Croatia (1993-2008), Czech Republic (1993-2008), Do-
minican Republic (1993-2008), Ecuador (1992-2008), Egypt (2001-2008), El Salvador (1998-2008), Es-
tonia (1994-2008), Ethiopia (1992-2000), Ghana (2005-2008), Guyana (1992-1999), Honduras (1993-
2007), Hong Kong (1998-2008) Hungary (1999-2008), Iceland (1988-2007), India (1991-2008), Indone-
sia (1999-2005), Jamaica (2001-2007), Kazakhstan (1993-2008), Korea (1985-2006), Latvia (2000-2008),
Lithuania (1997-2008), Kyrgyz Republic (1995-2008), Lao PDR (1999-2005), Macedonia (1998-2008),
Madagascar (2003-2008), Malaysia (1999-2008), Mauritius (1990-2008), Mexico (1985-2008), Mongolia
(1995-2002), Morocco (1996-2008), Mozambique (1986-1999), Myanmar (1999-2005), Nicaragua (1991-
2008), Pakistan (2001-2008), Paraguay (1990-2008), Peru (1992-2008), Philippines (1999-2008), Poland
(1994-2008), Romania (2005-2008), Russia (1998-2008), Serbia (2004-2008), Singapore (1999-2005),
Slovak Republic (1998-2007), Slovenia (1995-2007), South Africa (1996-2007), Swaziland (2001-2007),
Taiwan (1980-2007), Tajikistan (2004-2008), Thailand (1990-2008), Trinidad and Tobago (1990-2007),
Tunisia (1990-2007), Turkey (1992-2007), Uganda (1993-2002), Uruguay (2001-2005), Ukraine (2003-
2007), Venezuela (1990-2008), Vietnam (1999-2005)
Tables
Table A1. Summary Statistics: 1990-2007 (Countries of the Sectoral Sample)
Sector Mean Std. Dev Max Min Obs.
Gross FDI In
ows to Initial GDP 0.8636 0.9751 6.4317 0.0384 65
TFP growth 0.5110 0.5357 2.7565 -0.2727 66
Capital Account Openness Index 0.6445 0.2280 1.0000 0.1912 58
Initial GDP (PPP per capita) 6.7548 5.3064 25.9736 0.7404 66
General Government Balance to GDP # 0.0009 0.0276 0.1091 -0.0584 63
Old age dependency ratio # -0.0824 0.0458 0.0296 -0.1507 63
Population Growth (p.p.) # 0.5275 0.8732 2.2489 -1.2562 63
Initial NFA to GDP -0.6292 1.4261 1.6586 -9.0491 63
Oil trade balance to GDP -0.0121 0.0702 0.3067 -0.0939 62
Per capita real GDP growth 0.0290 0.0204 0.0931 -0.0156 66
Investment Prole 7.6193 1.2548 10.3792 4.9514 60
Note: # indicates in deviations from trading partners. Gross FDI in
ows are summed over the years of available
data and divided by initial GDP. TFP growth is dened as the ratio of TFP in the last year to TFP in the rst
year of available data. See Appendix A5 for a precise denition of the other variables.
37Table A2. Summary Statistics: Sectoral FDI in
ows and productivity growth
Sector Variable Mean Std. Dev Max Min Obs.
AB FDI USD (millions) 47 122 811 -5 63
% of Initial VA 0.06 0.12 0.65 -0.01 57
Productivity Dev. 0.48 0.52 2.09 -0.34 61
Industry(CDEF) FDI USD (millions) 2,014 5,074 37,292 -3 61
% of Initial VA 0.88 0.92 4.95 0.01 55
Productivity Dev. 0.43 0.44 1.64 -0.44 56
CE FDI USD (millions) 599 1,048 3,991 0 54
% of Initial VA 2.07 2.84 10.70 -0.01 43
Productivity Dev. 0.61 0.70 2.57 -0.41 44
C FDI USD (millions) 438 840 3,991 0 64
% of Initial VA 1.60 2.55 11.03 0.00 29
Productivity Dev. 0.55 0.69 2.28 -0.34 34
E FDI USD (millions) 178 386 1,904 -2 52
% of Initial VA 1.33 2.09 10.01 -0.01 32
Productivity Dev. 0.40 0.53 1.62 -0.42 39
D FDI USD (millions) 1,280 4,198 33,928 -780 69
% of Initial VA 0.75 0.76 3.35 -0.10 56
Productivity Dev. 0.60 0.61 2.46 -0.39 56
F FDI USD (millions) 100 206 1,127 -63 62
% of Initial VA 0.29 0.49 2.45 -0.10 50
Productivity Dev. 0.11 0.38 1.61 -0.66 53
Services FDI USD (millions) 2,196 4,754 31,675 3 61
% of Initial VA 0.68 0.86 4.68 -0.01 53
Productivity Dev. 0.22 0.28 1.05 -0.72 55
GH FDI USD (millions) 400 887 6,061 -8 55
% of Initial VA 0.59 0.81 3.34 -0.05 47
Productivity Dev. 0.23 0.41 1.33 -0.47 48
G FDI USD (millions) 359 871 5,913 -99 62
% of Initial VA 0.62 0.95 4.52 -0.09 25
Productivity Dev. 0.30 0.36 1.41 -0.37 30
H FDI USD (millions) 62 126 796 -1 50
% of Initial VA 0.28 0.37 1.25 -0.02 20
Productivity Dev. 0.02 0.28 0.61 -0.45 23
I FDI USD (millions) 301 533 3,406 0 58
% of Initial VA 0.80 0.80 3.36 0.02 49
Productivity Dev. 0.49 0.45 1.74 -0.08 51
JK FDI USD (millions) 1,412 3,410 24,173 0 63
% of Initial VA 1.12 1.59 9.58 0.00 41
Productivity Dev. -0.01 0.29 1.33 -0.66 51
JKLMNOPQ FDI USD (millions) 1,456 3,489 24,173 0 64
% of Initial VA 0.74 1.12 5.68 0.00 53
Productivity Dev. 0.17 0.24 0.98 -0.22 56
LMNOPQ FDI USD (millions) 55 238 1,948 0 71
% of Initial VA 0.03 0.05 0.24 0.00 47
Productivity Dev. 0.13 0.25 1.03 -0.27 55
Note: The table presents summary statistics for three variables. First, average annual FDI in
ows in millions
of current US Dollars over the years of available data ("FDI USD, Millions"). Second, summed FDI in
ows as a
fraction of initial value added in constant international USD ("% of Initial Value Added"). Third, productivity
growth which is the ratio of the change in labour productivity to labour productivity in the rst year of
available data. The base year used for the conversion into constant dollars is 2000 for C, E, G, H, JK and
LMNOPQ (and 1990 otherwise). According to the ISIC Rev.3.1 classication: Agriculture (AB), Mining and
quarrying (C), Manufacturing (D), Utilities (E), Construction (F), Trade and Tourism (GH), Transport, storage
and communications (I), Finance and business (JK) and other services (LMNOPQ). Note that, to provide an
overview on the sectoral FDI data, we give the summary statistics for FDI in current USD for all countries of
the sectoral sample (see Appendix B). In contrast, summary statistics for FDI in
ows scaled by initial value
added as well as productivity growth are based on the nal data set used in the paper (see data section and
data appendix).
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